Third of a four-part series LAST week, we examined Sara Duterte’s impeachment. This week, we return to a world confronting a different problem: What happens when even the strongest power cannot guarantee order? Our earlier column asked who guards the sea lanes. Developments around Iran offer an uncomfortable answer. Others begin protecting themselves, forming arrangements and providing order or their version of it. The vacuum never remains empty. It merely acquires several competing tenants. For years, the question was: If American dominance weakens, who replaces America? China? A coalition? Several powers balancing one another? The more disturbing possibility is that nobody can replace America everywhere. The war without a settlement Eight months after the war began, military punishment has not produced a durable settlement. An interim agreement in June failed to resolve the confrontation. Now renewed attacks on shipping and fears of another bombing campaign threaten diplomacy again. On Oct. 24, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan said Tehran remained open to negotiations. He described an offer to reopen Hormuz if Washington lifted its naval blockade. That is Iran’s account, not an agreed bargain. The distinction matters: Diplomatic proposals become achievements only when both sides accept and implement them. Wars are advertised as shortcuts to clarity. Superior force destroys capability. Sanctions compel concessions. Victory is announced, preferably before the bill arrives. America can destroy installations. Can it secure a lasting political outcome? It can deploy warships. Can it persuade every tanker owner and insurer that passage is safe? Firepower can open a campaign. It cannot, by itself, close the argument. The weaker power needs only to survive Iran cannot defeat America conventionally. It can nevertheless obstruct American objectives and impose costs. Survival becomes leverage, although survival should not be confused with prosperity or victory. Iran’s people bear the devastation. Economic pressure remains powerful. But a battered state can retain enough missiles, geography and determination to make everybody else’s recovery expensive. On Oct. 22, Iran claimed attacks on seven tankers in Hormuz. The British maritime monitor reported October’s highest number of commercial shipping attacks since March. These developments hardly encourage insurers to discover their adventurous side. A missile fired in the Gulf eventually appears as a higher diesel bill in Davao. Modern military power can punish a country. It cannot always make that country comply. That distinction is rewriting geopolitical arithmetic. The Mecca message On Aug. 7, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, treating an armed attack on one as an attack on all. Saudi Arabia brings financial weight, Turkey military and industrial capability, and Pakistan nuclear deterrence. The agreement does not replace America. These partners are building additional protection around relationships they already maintain. But signing agreements is easier than preparing for battle. Reuters reported on Oct. 21 that the pact had not produced additional support for Saudi Arabia. Pakistan already had forces there; Turkey’s parliament had yet to ratify the agreement. Houthi attacks have shown the gap between promising support and deciding who must act. Collective defense sounds impressive at the ceremony. It becomes less stirring when somebody asks who will send the first aircraft. The lesson is not that regional arrangements are useless. Their credibility depends on capabilities, domestic approval and agreed responsibilities. A treaty cannot intercept a missile merely by being beautifully bound. Regional powers move in Regional initiative also means diplomacy. On Oct. 23, Turkey hosted European and Middle Eastern foreign ministers in Istanbul for talks covering Hormuz and other conflicts. Countries exposed to the consequences are seeking a larger role in shaping the response. Such meetings guarantee nothing. They nevertheless show why the choice is broader than American leadership or complete disorder. China need not become a global policeman. It seeks sufficient economic, technological and military strength to prevent Washington from deciding outcomes unilaterally where Chinese interests are vital. India cooperates with America, maintains Russian ties, competes with China and cultivates Gulf relationships. It calls this strategic autonomy. Less elegant countries might call it keeping every telephone number. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Australia and Indonesia pursue different ambitions. None can police the world. Each can influence its neighborhood, build partnerships and complicate another power’s plans. The return of geography Globalization made us think geography mattered less. Money crossed borders, supply chains spanned the world and the internet erased distance. Then geography returned without asking anyone’s permission. Ukraine reminds Europe that Russia lives next door. Taiwan places semiconductor production beside a dangerous military flashpoint. Hormuz exposes energy supplies to disruption. The South China Sea reminds us that, regrettably, Palawan cannot be relocated. Regional powers possess one advantage over distant superpowers: they live there. America can redeploy. China cannot leave East Asia. India cannot leave the Indian Ocean. Geography keeps their interests close to home. But nearby powers are not necessarily friendly. The neighbor promising peace may also want the keys to your gate. Multipolar does not mean peaceful Several centers of power can produce balance. They can also produce competing rules, conflicting guarantees and more opportunities for miscalculation. Before the First World War, Europe had alliances, diplomacy and sophisticated governments. These did not prevent catastrophe. Commitments meant to deter war helped widen it. Today’s danger is not simply American retreat. It is that more actors can initiate events that nobody can control. Governments may intend limited retaliation; their adversaries may interpret it as preparation for something larger. Nor does Iran’s ability to disrupt shipping confer a legitimate right to control international passage. Explaining leverage does not excuse its abuse. Smaller countries need enforceable rules precisely because they cannot win every contest of force. Power is more than armies The strongest regional powers will not necessarily possess the most tanks. Power includes energy, technology, industry, finance, infrastructure and competent institutions. A country unable to supply reliable electricity, educate its people, administer laws or plan beyond the next election does not become strategically powerful by purchasing expensive weapons. It becomes a weak state with impressive equipment. National competence is national security. That lesson brings us uncomfortably close to home. For Manila, this means treating energy security, functioning ports, professional public service and credible defense as parts of one national strategy. Foreign policy cannot compensate indefinitely for failures of government. The question has changed America remains indispensable to many security arrangements, but indispensability is not omnipotence. China can challenge American purposes without assuming America’s burdens. Regional powers can shape their neighborhoods without stabilizing them. Smaller states and armed groups can disrupt systems they cannot manage. This is a world of competing partial orders. The question is: Who maintains order when nobody can impose it everywhere, yet several can disrupt it? The answer requires overlapping partnerships, negotiated rules and institutions strong enough to survive changing leaders. A world without one referee need not become a world without rules. But somebody must defend them. The Philippines cannot choose the world it inherits. Geography has already entered our name on the attendance sheet. We can choose whether to enter as an actor or become the arena where others compete. Next: The Philippines in a world without a referee. To be continued on Nov. 4, 2026000